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 Introduction
In this paper, we show that some typical environmental policy measures may increase
pollution levels in markets where products differ in some environmental features (green
markets). Firms differentiate their goods when they are able to extract rents from purchasers’
higher willingness-to-pay for less polluting varieties. In the presence of this strategic behavior,
government regulation does not only affect product environmental features but also consumers’
allocation in the market. This later effect may cause pollution increases even in the case where
the environmental quality of all products improve.
The literature has not analyzed the consequences of environmental policy on aggregate
pollution in markets with imperfect competition when products are heterogeneous. In
homogeneous product markets, environmental regulation generally induces an
overinternalization of pollution as firms may react by reducing their output levels. footnote  In
differentiated markets, Motta and Thisse (1993) examine the effects of the introduction of a
minimum environmental standard on firms’ quality choices and their international trade
strategies. Cremer and Thisse (1994) analyze the effects of ad-valorem taxation on the average
environmental quality in a natural oligopoly.
To capture the main characteristic of a green market, we build a duopoly model of vertical
product differentiation. footnote  Goods only differ in their associated level of emissions, which
is an endogenous variable. Purchasers, either buyers or firms, differ in their willingness-to-pay
for the goods but all prefer less-polluting varieties. On the supply side, there are two ex-ante
symmetric duopolists. They engage in a two-stage game, first choosing the variety to offer, and
then their prices. Producers’ investments in less-polluting technology, product design or, more
specifically, abatement devices, to reduce the level of emissions per unit of product are costly.
This fixed cost is higher the lower is the good’s unit emissions level chosen.
In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, two different varieties of the product emerge:
these are referred to as the cleaner and the dirtier variety. Interestingly, the higher the average
willingness-to-pay for the good, the lower are emissions per unit of product, but the higher is
aggregate pollution.
In this (imperfect) competitive market, the externality associated to pollution may still be
considered too high by governments. We study the effects of three common environmental
measures, namely, the introduction of mandated unit emission standards, technology subsidies
and product charges. footnote  Throughout, we do not describe optimal policies. Rather, our
concern is to illustrate the effects of these measures on firms’ product choices, aggregate
pollution and social welfare.
We first show that after imposing a unit emission standard close to the original (under no
regulation) equilibrium, total pollution increases. The intuition is that even though both firms
offer less-polluting varieties, sales increase sufficiently to overweight this effect. As a result of
the policy, the dirtier firm meets the requirement while the cleaner one best-responses by
improving its product as well. However, the presence of decreasing returns in the abatement
technology induces a lower effort of the cleaner firm to differentiate its good from the rival’s.
Thus, equilibrium product differentiation lowers, bringing about a tougher price competition
stage. Environmentally-friendlier varieties offered at lower prices soar sales sufficiently to
overweight the reduction in unit emissions.
This counter-productive quantitative effect does not emerge when firms are offered, instead,
a subsidy that lowers technology costs, and, consequently, equilibrium unit emissions. The
reason is that product differentiation does not change. This is also the case when uniform product
charges are implemented. However, both unit emissions and total contamination increase as a
result of the taxation policy. Finally, we investigate the effects of differentiating product charges.
We show that by slightly increasing the tax rate of the dirtier firm, both firms’ unit effluents
increase but aggregate pollution decreases. In contrast, by slightly lowering the tax rate of the
cleaner firm, both firms’ unit effluents and total contamination decrease. Again, firms’ strategic
behavior drives the undesirable results.As to the welfare consequences, we find that subsidies increase and uniform taxes decrease
social welfare. However, the overall effect of policies such as the introduction of a unit emission
standard and non-uniform product charges on social welfare depends on the marginal valuation
of the environmental damage.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
characterizes the unregulated equilibrium. In Section 3 we explore the effects of unit emissions
standards. In Section 4 we analyze the effects of investment subsidies while uniform and
non-uniform product charges are studied in Section 5. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
The model
We present a duopoly model of environmentally differentiated products. footnote  We
assume that two firms enter a market where different varieties of a product may be produced,
each of them identified by its observable level of associated polluting emissions (environmental
wastes or effluents). footnote  Manufacturing varieties whose levels of pollutant discharges are
lower will be assumed to be more costly.
The demand side of the market is constituted by a continuum of purchasers, either consumers
or firms, that differ in their marginal valuation for product green features, 2. This buyer-specific
matching value is assumed to be uniformly distributed on ¡0,2¢ with measure one. Purchasers
buy either one unit of the product or nothing. If they acquire a variety of the good whose level of
emissions is e at price p, they obtain a (indirect) utility W￿2,e￿ ￿ V " 2e " p. No consumption is
assumed to give zero surplus. footnote 
According to this specification, a purchaser that acquires the variety e obtains a gross surplus
V " 2e. One possible interpretation is that demand comes from environmentalist consumers.
Then, V would stand for the utility obtained from the good regardless of the level of emissions of
the variety acquired. Environmentalists, in addition, derive a desutility 2e from purchasing a
good whose level of emissions is e. footnote  Since 2 varies across individuals, consumers differ
in their environmental awareness. The parameter 2 would then measure the degree of consumers’
environmental consciousness.
An alternative interpretation is to consider that purchasers are a set of small firms
non-competing among them that employ the goods as inputs for their production processes. This
input is not substitutable, i.e. if a firm wants to enter its respective market must acquire it.
Emissions associated to the inputs are by-products of the small firms production activities. These
effluents are taxed according to the linear function t￿e￿ ￿ e. The parameter 2 would then
represent the firm-specific financial opportunity cost, and V would stand for the net benefits each
firm would obtain from entering its market. Under either of these interpretations, note that if
purchases were given a free choice between any pair of different varieties, they would agree and
choose the one with the lowest level of emissions associated. This characteristic implies that our
model falls into the category of product differentiation models. footnote 
Throughout the analysis, we will use the following assumption:
Assumption 1 V is sufficiently small so that not all purchasers acquire the good in
equilibrium.
This assumption, which is formalized below, implies that the market is not covered, i.e. some
consumers do not consume the good or some firms do not enter their respective
markets. footnote 
The ex-ante symmetric duopolists have access to the same technology. We assume that to
produce the variety e, they must incur the fixed cost C￿e￿. Further, it is assumed that once a firm
has incurred the technological cost to ensure the provision of the variety e, production takes
place at a unit marginal cost c that is independent of the level of effluents chosen by the firm. We
normalize c to zero. We also assume that producing varieties with lower levels of emissions is
more costly, i.e. CU￿e￿ ￿ 0. For computational reasons, C￿e￿ is assumed to be a homogenous
function of degree ) ￿ 0. This implies that the technology for the production of the good e
exhibits decreasing returns.Competition between the duopolists takes place in two stages: In the first, firms
simultaneously decide the variety to produce. In the second stage, when technological costs have
already been invested, firms compete in prices. This two-stage modelling is motivated by the fact
that, often, firms can rapidly change their prices while a change in the production technology
takes place in the long run. In our context, it is reasonable to assume that abatement technology
decisions are long-run variables while prices are short-run ones. We will look for the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game and proceed by backwards induction.
We will consider the following social welfare function: footnote 
SW ￿ CS ￿$ T"o ￿ E T￿   #   
where CS and $T denote consumers surplus and aggregate profits respectively, and o￿￿￿ is the
social valuation of environmental damage caused by aggregate pollution, ET.
Next we compute the equilibrium under no regulation. Throughout, the firm that chooses a
higher (lower) level of effluents will be referred to as the dirtier (cleaner) firm. Without any loss
of generality, we consider firm 1 (firm 2) as the dirtier (cleaner) firm, offering a product with
associated level of emissions e1 (e2￿ at price p1 (p2￿. Reasonably, e1 ￿ e2 and p1 ￿ p2. footnote 
To derive the demand function for each variety, we define the following critical parameters.
There is one purchaser indifferent between acquiring either of the products. This buyer is
characterized by the taste parameter
¤
2 satisfying V "
¤
2e2 " p2 ￿ V "
¤
2e1 " p1. Therefore, ¤
2 ￿ ￿p2 " p1￿/￿e1 " e2￿. Assumption  ref: A1  implies that there are two more critical
parameters: the first corresponds to that purchaser indifferent between buying the cleaner good
and nothing. This buyer is identified by the parameter
§
2 ￿ ￿V " p2￿/e2. The second one is the
purchaser indifferent between acquiring the dirtier product and not buying at all, i.e. § §







2 ￿ 2. footnote  Thus, demand for the dirtier firm stems from the group of
consumers whose parameter 2 is such that 0 t 2 t
¤
2 while demand for the cleaner firm comes
from those customers 2 such that
¤
2 t 2 t
§ §
2. The rest of purchasers buy nothing. Therefore,
dirtier and cleaner firm’s demands are respectively
q1￿￿￿ ￿ p2 " p1
2￿e1 " e2￿
, q2￿￿￿ ￿ V " p2
2e2
" p2 " p1
2￿e1 " e2￿
.   #   
In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose prices to maximize their profits
$i ￿ piqi " C￿ei￿, i ￿ 1, 2. Note that given any two levels of emissions satisfying e1 ￿ e2, the
second stage profits functions are strictly concave with respect to the prices. Therefore, necessary
conditions also suffice for profits maximization. From the first order conditions (f.o.c.), we
obtain the corresponding reaction functions
p1 ￿ p2
2 , p2 ￿ V￿e1 " e2￿ ￿ e2p1
2e1
.   #   
By solving the system of equations ( ref: rf1 ), we obtain both duopolists’ equilibrium prices
p1
’￿e1,e2￿ ￿ V￿e1 " e2￿
4e1 " e2
, p2
’￿e1,e2￿ ￿ 2V￿e1 " e2￿
4e1 " e2
.   #   
Note that, as expected, p2
’￿e1,e2￿ ￿ p1
’￿e1,e2￿, i.e. the more polluting variety is offered at a











￿ V￿2e1 ￿ e2￿
e2￿4e1 " e2￿
.   #   




At this point it is convenient to define the variable 5 ￿ e1/e2, 5 ￿ 1, and rewrite both prices
and quantities. This new variable measures the relative degree of product
differentiation. footnote  Suppose for the moment that an equilibrium exists (below, we analyzeits existence, see Proposition  ref: Prop5 ). First, equilibrium prices can be rewritten as
p1
’￿5￿ ￿ V￿5 " 1￿
45 " 1 , p2
’￿5￿ ￿ 2V￿5 " 1￿
45 " 1 .   #   
Note that as the relative product differentiation diminishes (5￿, firms face a tougher price
competition stage and equilibrium prices consequently fall down (￿pi/￿5 ￿ 0, i ￿ 1,2).
Each duopolist’s aggregate pollution is given by Ei ￿ qiei, i ￿ 1,2. Using ( ref: p11 ),
equilibrium market shares can be rewritten as:
q1￿5,e2￿ ￿ V
2￿45 " 1￿e2
, q2￿5,e2￿ ￿ 25V
2￿45 " 1￿e2
.   #   
Therefore, dirtier and cleaner firm’s aggregate pollution is
E1 ￿ 5V
2￿45 " 1￿
, E2 ￿ 25V
2￿45 " 1￿
,   #   
respectively. Interestingly, aggregate pollution crucially depends on the degree of product
differentiation. By differentiating, it is obtained that ￿Ei/￿5 ￿ 0, i ￿ 1,2. This means that total
pollution increases as the degree of product differentiation decreases. The intuition is that if
firms differentiate their products to a lower extent, they face a stronger price competition stage,
that consequently lower equilibrium prices (see ( ref: p11 )). As a result, both firms’ market sizes
increase. Since total contamination depends on sales, it increases. To summarize:
Lemma Both firms’ equilibrium aggregate pollution ￿Ei, i ￿ 1,2￿ increases as the equilibrium
degree of product differentiation decreases (5￿.
As explained below, the equilibrium degree of product differentiation does not depend on V
and 2 (see equation ( ref: equi )). This enable us to already extract some comparative statics.
First, note that both firms’ aggregate pollution (see ( ref: emi )) increase as the parameter V
raises. This means that the higher the purchasers’ valuation for the goods, the higher is the
equilibrium industrial total contamination. This is simply due to the fact that the size of the
active market is larger because buyers’ willingness to pay for the goods is also higher. Second,
observe that aggregate pollution decreases as parameter 2 increases. Therefore, contamination is
a decreasing function of the degree of population’s environmental awareness. This is also
reasonable because the higher the average consumers’ environmental consciousness, the lower is
their average willingness-to-pay for the products. As a result, equilibrium sales are lower and,
consequently, aggregate pollution is also lower. We summarize next:
Proposition Equilibrium aggregate pollution (a) increases as the valuation of the product (V￿
increases and (b) decreases as the degree of purchasers’ environmental awareness (2￿
increases.
Next, we analyze firms’ first stage decisions, i.e. environmental variety choices. Anticipating
that second stage equilibrium prices will be given by equations ( ref: p1 ), the dirtier firm
chooses e1 to maximize
$1￿e1,e2￿ ￿ V2￿e1 " e2￿
2￿4e1 " e2￿2 " C￿e1￿,   #   
and the cleaner one selects e2 to maximize
$2￿e1,e2￿ ￿ 4V2e1￿e1 " e2￿
2￿4e1 " e2￿2e2
" C￿e2￿.   #   
Note that both firms would obtain zero revenues in case they offered identical varieties
￿e1 ￿ e2￿. To increase revenues (and hence profits), duopolists have an incentive to relax price
competition by differentiating their goods. This is what actually happens in equilibrium. The
f.o.c. for both firms’ decision problems are:
V2￿4e1 " 7e2￿
2￿"4e1 ￿ e2￿3 " CU￿e1￿ ￿ 0   #   4V2e1￿4e1
2 " 3e1e2 ￿ 2e2
2￿
2￿"4e1 ￿ e2￿3e2
2 " CU￿e2￿ ￿ 0   #   
Using 5, we can rewrite conditions ( ref: cpo1 ) and ( ref: cpo2 ) as:
V252￿45 " 7￿
2￿45 " 1￿3 ￿ "e1
2CU￿e1￿   #   
4V25￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿
2￿45 " 1￿3 ￿ "e2
2CU￿e2￿   #   
Since C￿￿￿ is a homogeneous function of degree ), we can divide equations ( ref: equation1 )
and ( ref: equation2 ) to obtain:
45 " 7 " 45)￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 0   #   
Equation ( ref: equi ) describes those pairs ￿),5￿)￿￿ that may constitute an equilibrium. By
graphically representing the zero-level contour curve defined by the left-hand side of equation
( ref: equi ), it is easily checked that this equation has a unique real solution satisfying 5 ￿ 1 for
all ) t" 2. Moreover, the solution verifies that 5U￿)￿ ￿ 0, i.e. the lower the degree of
homogeneity of the cost function, the lower is the equilibrium product differentiation. This
finding allow us to state that:
Proposition The lower the degree of homogeneity ()￿ of the (fixed) cost function C￿￿￿, the higher is
each firm equilibrium aggregate pollution (Ei, i ￿ 1,2￿.
Note that ) measures the degree of convexity of the cost function. The lower parameter ),
the more convex is C￿￿￿. An increase in ) implies that firms must incur higher fixed costs in
order to differentiate their products. As a consequence, duopolists differentiate their goods to a
lower extent in equilibrium. This fact together with lemma  ref: l1  proves the result.
In Appendix B, we demonstrate that ) t" 2 is a necessary condition for a solution to
equation ( ref: equi ) to be an equilibrium. In addition, it is checked that a solution to
( ref: equation1 ) and ( ref: equation2 ) satisfies the second order conditions and that both firms
make positive profits. Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove in general that neither of the
firms has an incentive to leapfrog its rival’s choice. However, for the function C￿e￿ ￿ k
e2 , this is
easily shown. The following proposition states the existence of the equilibrium:
Proposition For a subgame perfect equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that ) t" 2. If an
equilibrium exists, it is unique (up to a permutation of firms). The equilibrium product
differentiation is given by equation ( ref: equi ) while the dirtier and the cleaner firm’s
equilibrium unit emissions are given by equations ( ref: equation1 ) and ( ref: equation2 ),
respectively. The set of costs functions C￿e￿ for which an equilibrium exists is not empty.
From equations ( ref: equation1 ) and ( ref: equation2 ), we can obtain additional
comparative statics results. Using Euler’s theorem and the fact that ) t" 2, it is easily seen that
the right-hand side of equation ( ref: equation1 ) is decreasing in e1. Analogously, the right-hand
side of expression ( ref: equation2 ) also decreases with e2. These two facts enable us to state
that:
Proposition Both firms’ equilibrium unit emissions (ei, i ￿ 1,2￿ (a) decrease as the valuation of the
product (V￿ increases, and (b) increase as purchasers’ environmental awareness (2￿
increases.
In equilibrium, consumers’ surplus, aggregate profits, and total pollution can be written as:
CS ￿ V25￿45 ￿ 5￿
22￿45 " 1￿2e2
,   #   
$T ￿ V2￿45 ￿ 1￿￿5 " 1￿
2￿45 " 1￿2e2
" C￿e1￿ " C￿e2￿,   #   ET ￿ 3V5
45 " 1 .   #   
These expressions will be used to evaluate policy effects on social welfare as explained above.
Unit Emission Standards
Consider now that the regulator imposes a unit (maximum) emission standard. Indeed,
standards in the form of input content or emissions per unit of output is the most used form of
environmental regulation. Let e denote this mandated standard and consider the unregulated
market equilibrium analyzed previously (equations ( ref: equation1 ), ( ref: equation2 ) and
( ref: equi )). Note first that an emission standard set above the level of emissions of the dirtier
product (e1￿ would not have effects at all on the previous unregulated equilibrium. Observe also
that a very stringent standard might cause non-existence of a duopoly equilibrium. To avoid such
troubles we here restrict the analysis to standards set arbitrarily close to and below the level of
emissions chosen by the dirtier firm in the original (unregulated) equilibrium. footnote 
Consider that e is set slightly below the dirtier firm’s unit emissions in the unregulated
equilibrium (e1￿. In the new (regulated) equilibrium, the dirtier firm meets the requirement and
the cleaner one chooses its emissions by best-responding its rival’s choice (the standard). Thus,
e1 ￿ e   #   
and e2 satisfies footnote 
"4V2e￿4e2 " 3ee2 ￿ 2e2
2￿
2￿4e " e2￿3e2
2 " CU￿e2￿ ￿ 0   #   











.   #   
Note that the denominator of this expression is nothing else than the s.o.c. of firm 2’s
maximization problem, whose sign is negative in a neighborhood of the original equilibrium (see
equation ( ref: cso2 ) in Appendix B). Since the numerator is clearly positive, we conclude that:
Lemma After imposing a unit emission standard arbitrarily close to and below the emissions of
the variety chosen by the dirtier firm in the unregulated equilibrium, the cleaner firm
best-responses by reducing its unit effluents as well.
The direct implication of this lemma is that the establishment of a unit emission standard
seems a proper policy to reduce goods’ unit effluents. footnote  The intuition stems from the fact
that firms differentiate their products to avoid a tougher price competition stage (see ( ref: p11 )).
Thus, anticipating that the dirtier firm will meet the standard, the best strategy for the cleaner one
is to reduce the emissions of its variety too.
By using variable 5, we can describe the (new) equilibrium by equations:
e2 ￿ e
5   #   
"4V253￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿
2￿45 " 1￿3e2 " CU￿e￿
5)"1 ￿ 0.   #   
Equation ( ref: ue ) gives the implicit relation between the equilibrium product differentiation
and the effluent standard imposed. By employing both Euler’s and the implicit function
theorems, we find that
d5
de
￿ " e￿) ￿ 1￿CU￿e￿2￿45 " 1￿4
4V25)￿1￿)￿1653 " 1652 ￿ 115 " 2￿ ￿ 1653 " 1652 ￿ 5 " 4￿
.   #   
We can evaluate the sign of this derivative in a neighborhood of the original equilibrium, i.e.
where ) and 5 satisfy  ref: equi . Since ) t" 2, the numerator of this expression is positive.




￿1653 " 1652 ￿ 115 " 2￿ ￿ 1653 " 1652 ￿ 5 " 4 ￿ 0.   #   
It is easily checked that this expression is negative. Therefore
Lemma Equilibrium product differentiation reduces after imposing a maximum emission
standard arbitrarily close to and below the emissions of the variety chosen by the dirtier
firm in the unregulated equilibrium.
The existence of decreasing returns in the abatement technology is crucial for this result. As
a result of the mandated standard, the dirtier firm diminishes its unit effluents, which reduces
product differentiation and fosters price competition. To alleviate the effects of the tougher
interaction, the cleaner firm decreases its unit emissions as well. However, due to the fact that
abatement technology exhibits decreasing returns, the cleaner firm’s effort to reduce effluents is
lower than the dirtier’s one. As a result, after-policy equilibrium product differentiation reduces.
Taking into consideration the effects of the measure on product differentiation, and hence on
prices, firms’ sales, and purchasers’ allocation in the market, we can state that:
Proposition After imposing a maximum emission standard arbitrarily close to and below the
emissions of the variety chosen by the dirtier firm in the unregulated equilibrium, both
firms’ aggregate pollution increases.
The proof follows immediately from lemmas ( ref: l1 ) and ( ref: l3 ). The key issue here is
that the decrease in the product differentiation fosters price competition and, therefore, firms’
equilibrium prices fall. Both effects, the decrease in prices and the decrease in products’ unit
effluents, soar firms’ sales. This negative effect with respect to aggregate pollution compensates
for the positive effects of the policy on the equilibrium unit emissions of the varieties, thus
leading to an increase in total contamination.
We next evaluate the social welfare effects of the introduction of a unit emission standard.
We analyze its effects on consumers surplus, aggregate firms’ profits and total pollution
separately. From ( ref: CS1 ), we can compute
dCS
de










de ￿ 0 and
de2
de ￿ 0 (see lemmas  ref: l2  and  ref: l3 ), then dCS
de ￿ 0. Therefore,
consumer surplus increases after imposing the unit effluent standard. Consumers clearly
beneficiate from the policy not only because it lowers goods’ unit emissions but also because it
brings about a price war strong enough to lower prices substantially.
Aggregate profits (see ( ref: Piagre )) can be written as
$T ￿ V2￿452 " 35 " 1￿5
2￿45 " 1￿2e





￿ V2￿1653 " 1252 ￿ 105 ￿ 1￿






" V25￿452 " 35 " 1￿




In a neighborhood of the original equilibrium, CU e
5 satisfies equation ( ref: equation2 ).
Employing this relationship, and that d5
de ￿ 0, it is easily seen that
d$T
de ￿ 0. Therefore,
equilibrium industry profits decrease after the introduction of the standard.
Putting together consumers’ and producers surplus and evaluating its sign in a neighborhood
of the unregulated equilibrium (i.e. where ) and 5 satisfy equation ( ref: equi )), we obtain that
the net effect of the standard is an increase in market surplus.
Finally, by lemma ( ref: l1 ), we know that aggregate pollution increases. This allows us to
state that:Proposition After imposing a unit emission standard arbitrarily close to and below the emissions of




’ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿CS ￿$ T￿
￿ e e ￿ e 1
’.
This proposition shows that social welfare might decrease after introducing a maximum
emissions standard that lower both products’ unit emissions. This is due to the adverse effect that
an increase in sales causes on aggregate pollution.
Technology Subsidization
Besides unit standards, direct subsidy on technological costs are widely used to impel firms’
investment in abatement or to mitigate the economic impact of compliance with regulation. The
subsidization of technological acquisition results in lower capital costs through, generally,
cheaper loans, tax allowances or grants. For instance, France offer loans to control water
pollution; Italy favors industries that commit themselves to introduce production processes that
recuperate and recycle solid waste; The Netherlands offers financial assistance to promote
compliance with regulation, promote technology research and the introduction of pollution
control; Sweden employ subsidies to diminish pesticide sprays (see Hanley et al. (1997)). This
type of subsidies does not generally depend on emissions’ reduction but on firms’ investment.
Indeed, most of government aids to environmental investment are not subject to pollution
abatement levels. That is the case for example in the PITMA program of the Spanish Ministry of
Industry and Trade since 1991 or the US subsidies to construct water treatment plants and soil
conservation efforts of farmers. footnote 
Consider that the industry we have described benefits from a subsidization policy that
reduces abatement costs. Let the subsidized cost function be
Ci ￿ C￿ei￿￿1 " s￿ i ￿ 1,2.   #   
As above, to avoid non-existence problems of a duopoly equilibrium, we concentrate on the






U￿e1￿   #   





U￿e2￿.   #   
Note first that a subsidy s per dollar of abatement cost does not affect equilibrium product
differentiation. Indeed, by dividing equations ( ref: focsub1 ) and ( ref: focsub2 ), it is obtained
that 5 must satisfy equation ( ref: equi ). However, both goods’ unit emissions fall. In fact, by
applying both the Euler’s and implicit function theorems to equations ( ref: focsub1 ) and




￿1 " s￿￿1 ￿ )￿
￿ 0, i ￿ 1,2.   #   
Observe also that this effect is smaller the greater the curvature of firms’ cost function, i.e.
dei
2
d)ds ￿ ei/￿s " 1￿￿1 ￿ )￿
2 ￿ 0, i ￿ 1,2.
Since 5 does not change in the new equilibrium, neither equilibrium prices (see ( ref: p11 ))
nor aggregate emissions (see ( ref: emi )) varies with s. Even though both firms lower unit
emissions, sales increase such that the reduction of unit effluents is compensated by the increase
in production.
We next evaluate the effects of the introduction of the subsidy on social welfare. First,
consumers surplus increases as s increases (from ( ref: CS1 ) and ( ref: e1_sub_der )). Second,
aggregate profits can be written in this case as$T ￿ V2￿452 " 35 " 1￿
2e2￿45 " 1￿2 " ￿1 " s￿￿1 ￿ 5)￿C￿e2￿.   #   




2￿1 " s￿e2￿45 " 1￿3￿1 ￿ )￿
￿452 " 35 " 1￿￿45 " 1￿ ￿ 45￿1 ￿ 5)￿￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿
) .
Evaluating this expression in a neighborhood of the unregulated equilibrium, i.e. employing
equation ( ref: equi ), it is easily seen that
￿$T
￿s ￿ 0. Finally, since 5 does not vary with s,
aggregate pollution remains unaltered. We summarize our findings next:
Proposition A direct subsidy on abatement investment (a) reduces both firms unit emissions and (b)
has no impact on the equilibrium aggregate pollution in the market. As to the welfare
consequences, it increases consumers surplus and firms’ profits. Therefore, social
welfare increases.
Product charges
Polluting product charges are widely used to influence firms’ behavior to reduce the quantity
or improve the quality of pollution. By putting a charge directly on the product or input that
causes environmental damage, the regulation avoids the information problems associated with
first-best schemes such as emission or ambient charges. This is the case for Sweden and Norway,
where product charges are applied to batteries, fertilizers and pesticides. Tobacco, fossil-fuels
and cars, are other examples of goods facing special charges. Moreover, current government
agendas, e.g. Italy’s one, include special taxes for energy production through an ecotax and
product containers (e.g. Italy levies a tax on plastic bags). footnote 
Consider that an ad-valorem charge ti is imposed on firm i, i ￿ 1,2. Firm i’s profit is then
given by:
=i ￿ ￿1 " ti￿piqi " C￿ei￿, i ￿ 1,2.   #   
We define Ai ￿ 1/￿1 " ti￿ as the tax burden of the firm i. Note first that Ai u 1 defines a tax
(0 t ti t 1￿ while Ai t 1 defines a subsidy (ti t 0￿. Besides, setting A1 ￿ A2 ￿ 1, we obtain the
unregulated equilibrium analyzed above. As explained above, we concentrate the analysis on
values of Ai near 1. Multiplying ( ref: taxprof ) by Ai, we obtain:
Ai=i ￿ piqi " AiC￿ei￿, i ￿ 1,2.   #   
The following observations are useful in what follows: Both the firm i’s optimal strategy facing
the commodity tax ti and the cost function C￿ei￿, and the one facing the cost function AiC￿ei￿
and not being taxed at all, are exactly the same. Note also that, for any ￿e1,e2￿, equilibrium
prices under emission charges are the same as those under no regulation, i.e. prices ( ref: p11 ).
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U￿e2￿.   #   
By dividing these two equations, we obtain that
+ ￿ ￿45 " 7￿/￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿45),   #   
where the parameter + ￿ A1/A2 measures firms’ charge differentiation. Interestingly, if A1 ￿ A2,
then + ￿ 1, therefore, equations ( ref: equi ) and ( ref: equitax ) coincide. This implies that the
equilibrium product differentiation does not change whenever both firms charges are identical.
By properly differentiating ( ref: equitax ), we obtaind5
d+
￿ "
"4￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿5)
4￿1 " 5)+￿￿85 " 3￿ ￿ ￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿
)
5 ￿
  #   
Evaluating this derivative in a neighborhood of the unregulated equilibrium, i.e. where + ￿ 1 and
) and 5 satisfy equation ( ref: equi ), it is obtained that d5/d+ ￿ 0. Therefore:
Lemma (a) If the dirtier firm’s charge increases, equilibrium product differentiation increases. (b)
If the cleaner firm’s charge increases, equilibrium product differentiation decreases. If
both firms’ charges vary such that + ￿ 1, equilibrium product differentiation does not
change.
This lemma implies that the strategic effects of imposing a product charge to an individual
firm are essentially different. This will have interesting implications on the policy effects as
explained below.
Uniform commodity taxation
Consider first that both firms are charged equally, i.e. A1 ￿ A2 ￿ A. A uniform rate can be
justified in terms of information requirements or due to possible legal constraints impeding
charge rates differentiation among firms participating in the same industry. An illustrative
example of this policy is the green point charge in Spain, where all types of market containers
face a common charge on the product value.
Applying both the Euler’s and the implicit function theorems to equations ( ref: foc1tax ) and





￿ 0; i ￿ 1,2.   #   
Equation ( ref: dedtau ) and lemma ( ref: l4 ) allow us to state that:
Proposition The introduction of a uniform ad-valorem product charge a) increases both firms’
equilibrium unit emissions and b) does not affect aggregate pollution levels.
The reason is that even though unit emissions increase, firms end up selling less quantity of
their products.
Finally we evaluate social welfare effects. Consumer surplus is given by ( ref: CS1 ). Since
equilibrium product differentiation does not change with A, from ( ref: dedtau ) we conclude that
consumer surplus decreases. Firms’ profits, on the other hand, are given by
$T ￿ V2￿452 " 35 " 1￿
Ae2￿45 " 1￿22
" ￿1 ￿ 5)￿C￿e2￿.   #   






) ￿ 1 ￿45 ￿ 1￿￿5 " 1￿ ￿ 455)￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿ .   #   
which is clearly negative. To summarize:
Proposition A small uniform product charge decreases consumers’ surplus and firms’ profits while
aggregate contamination does not vary. As a result, social welfare decreases.
Non-uniform product charges
Consider now the case where firms face different charge rates. Given that a uniform charge
does not affect total emissions, we want to investigate the effects of tax differentiation in this
market. This is the case, for example, of fuels in most European countries, where unleaded fuel
faces lower tax rates.
By undertaking some algebra and evaluating the following derivatives in a neighborhood of






















￿ 0; j p i; i ￿ 1,2.   #   By lemmas  ref: l1  and  ref: l4 , and ( ref: deidtaui ) and ( ref: dejdtaui ) we can state that:
Proposition Consider the duopoly game described above where both firms face a uniform ad-valorem
product charge policy. Then,
(1) by slightly raising (diminishing) the charge of the dirtier firm, (a) both firms’ unit
emissions increase (decrease) and (b) aggregate pollution decreases (increases).
(2) by slightly raising (diminishing) the charge of the cleaner firm, (a) both firms’ unit
emissions increase (decrease) and (b) aggregate pollution increases (decreases).
This result illustrates the existence of an equivalence between the effects on aggregate
pollution of an increase (decrease) of the dirtier firm’s charge and a decrease (increase) of the
cleaner firm’s charge. Both policies diminish (raise) total pollution.
Now we proceed to evaluate the effects of charge differentiation on social welfare. First,













; i ￿ 1,2.   #   
To evaluate the sign of this derivative, note that from ( ref: CS1 ), it follows that ￿CS/￿e2 ￿ 0
and ￿CS/￿5 ￿ 0. From ( ref: foc2tax ), it is seen that ￿e2/￿5 ￿ 0. Lemma  ref: l4  implies that
￿5/￿+ ￿ 0. Therefore, the sign of the derivative ( ref: dsdtaui ) depends on the sign of ￿+/￿Ai.
Indeed, consumers surplus increases as cleaner firm’s charge raises, while it decreases as
dirtier firm’s tax increases. The intuition behind this difference is that, even though unit
emissions increase in both cases (diminishing CS), the increase of A2 decreases product
differentiation, thus fostering price competition (hence increasing CS). The later dominates the
former.
Second, aggregate profits are given by
$T ￿
V2￿5 " 1￿￿45 ￿ 1
+ ￿
e22￿45 " 1￿2A2
" ￿1 ￿ 5a￿C￿e2￿.















; i ￿ 1,2.   #   
Note that ￿$T/￿e2 ￿ 0, ￿e2/￿5 ￿ 0 and ￿$T/￿5 ￿ 0. By evaluating this derivative in a
neighborhood of the equilibrium ￿+ ￿ 1 and ) and 5 satisfy ( ref: equi )￿, we obtain that the sign
of this derivative is negative.
Moreover, the net effect over market surplus (i.e. consumer surplus plus total profits) is
negative in both cases. Taking into account lemmas  ref: l1  and  ref: l4 , we can state that:
Proposition (a) By slightly increasing the product charge to the dirtier firm market surplus and
aggregate emissions decrease. Therefore, social welfare increases if and only if:
￿o￿￿￿
￿A1 A1￿A2,+￿1
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿CS ￿$ T￿
￿ A 1 A 1￿ A 2, + ￿ 1
.
(b) By slightly increasing the product charge to the cleaner firm market surplus decreases
and aggregate emissions increase. Therefore, social welfare decreases.
Note that these results are particularly interesting in the case where total pollution levels are
considered by the regulator in order to differentiate the tax rate.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have examined the impact of some environmental policy instruments on
aggregate pollution in a differentiated industry. Our results demonstrate that pollution might
increase as a result of government regulation. More precisely, in our model contamination
increases after setting a unit emission standard and by imposing a product charge to the cleaner
firm. This counter-productive effect is due to the firms’ strategic response to the regulation.
Moreover, environmental policies might result in social welfare losses. Our findings suggest that
environmental regulatory policy in differentiated markets must take into consideration not onlyits effects on the products’ environmental features but also its implications on the consumers’
allocations between firms. This issue has not been pointed out by the literature so far.
Throughout we have employed some assumptions that deserve a discussion. Our modeling
choice included non-covered market situation and technological fixed costs. Alternatively, we
could have used a covered market with emission-dependent variable costs (as in Crampes and
Hollander (1995)). Some computations have turned out to show that the fact that pollution might
increase as a result of government regulation is robust to these modeling changes. In fact, in this
latter case, regulation affects also product differentiation, which leads to a re-division of market
shares between the firms. As a result, pollution may also increase.
Goods’ emissions do not necessarily enter linearly in the decision rule of the purchasers, as
opposed to our assumption. For instance, we could have used the purchasers’ decision rule
V " 2t￿e￿ " p u 0. The main difference is that pollution would not always increase as a result of
the reduction of product differentiation (as opposed to our lemma  ref: l1 ). However, it can be
seen that the result that contamination might increase as a consequence of government policy
would be reproduced under some parametric conditions.
The effects of other instruments – such as marketable permits – on aggregate pollution
remain to be investigated. First-best schemes – such as Pigouvian taxes – introduce complex
computations in this type of models. Even though the effects of Pigouvian taxes must be










2 ￿ 2, an equilibrium
does not exist. Demands would be given by
q1￿￿￿ ￿ p2 " p1
￿e1 " e2￿2
, q2￿￿￿ ￿ V " p2
2e2
" p2 " p1
2￿e1 " e2￿
  #   
By optimizing profits with respect to prices and solving the reaction functions we obtain prices
p1 ￿ V￿5 " 1￿
45 " 1 , p2 ￿ 2V￿5 " 1￿
45 " 1 .   #   




2. Therefore, this parameter
configuration cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Appendix B
First note that equation ( ref: equi ) has a real solution satisfying 5 u 1 only if ) t" 2. Next,
we prove that second order conditions (s.o.c.) are verified and that both firms make positive
profits in equilibrium. Finally, we show that for the case C￿e￿ ￿ k
e2 , neither of the firms has an
incentive to leapfrog its rival’s choice. Therefore, the set of functions for which an equilibrium
exists is not empty.
Both firms s.o.c. are
￿2$1
￿e1
2 ￿ 16V2￿2e1 " 5e2￿









3￿4e1 " e2￿4 " CUU￿e2￿.   #   
By using Euler’s theorem and equation ( ref: cpo1 ), equation ( ref: cso1 ) can be rewritten as
￿2$1
￿e1
2 ￿ 16V2￿2e1 " 5e2￿
2￿4e1 " e2￿4 ￿ ￿) " 1￿V2￿4e1 " 7e2￿
2e1￿4e1 " e2￿3 .   #   
By rearranging and using the variable 5, this expression reduces to
￿2$1
￿e1
2 ￿ V2￿165￿25 " 5￿ ￿ ￿) " 1￿￿45 " 7￿￿45 " 1￿￿
25￿45 " 1￿4e2
3 ,   #   which has negative sign whenever 165￿25 " 5￿ ￿ ￿) " 1￿￿45 " 7￿￿45 " 1￿ ￿ 0. By using the
equilibrium equation ( ref: equi ) we can substitute the value of ) to obtain the inequality




" 1 ￿45 " 7￿￿45 " 1￿ ￿ 0.   #   
It is easy to check that the left-hand side of inequality ( ref: ineq1 ) defines a negative
continuously decreasing function in the relevant range (i.e. its derivative is a strictly negative
concave function for all 5 ￿ 1; in fact, it reaches a maximum of "82.4654 ￿ 0a t5￿2.68915￿.
Therefore, the s.o.c. for the dirtier firm is always satisfied.
By proceeding analogously, the cleaner firm’s s.o.c. ( ref: cso2 ) can be rewritten as
￿2$1
￿e1
2 ￿ 45V2￿3253 " 3252 ￿ 125 " 6 ￿ ￿) " 1￿￿45 " 1￿￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿￿
2￿45 " 1￿4e2
3 .   #   
This expression is negative whenever
3253 " 3252 ￿ 125 " 6 ￿ ￿) " 1￿￿45 " 1￿￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 0. By again using ( ref: equi ), this
inequality reduces to




" 1 ￿45 " 1￿￿452 " 35 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 0.   #   
This expression has indeed a negative sign everywhere (for 5 ￿ 1￿. In fact, it is a strictly concave
expression reaching its maximum value at 5 ￿ 2.03375. At this point, the inequality reduces to
"406.415 ￿ 0. Therefore, the cleaner firm’s s.o.c. is satisfied too.
We now check that both firms make positive profits in equilibrium. First, dirtier firm’s
profits are given by ( ref: pi1 ). By using Euler’s theorem and properly rearranging, firm 1’s
benefits can be rewritten as
$1 ￿ V2￿)￿45 " 1￿￿5 " 1￿ ￿ 5￿45 " 7￿￿
2)￿45 " 1￿3e2
.   #   
This expression is positive as long as )￿45 " 1￿￿5 " 1￿ ￿ 5￿45 " 7￿ ￿ 0, i.e. whenever (using




￿45 " 1￿￿5 " 1￿ ￿ 5￿45 " 7￿ ￿ 0.   #   
The function defined by the left-hand side of inequality ( ref: ineq3 ) is strictly concave and
reaches a maximum value of "36.9502 ￿ 0a t5￿2.05982. Therefore, dirtier firm obtains
positive profits in equilibrium.
Second, equation ( ref: pi2 ) gives cleaner firm’s equilibrium profits. It can be rewritten as
$2 ￿ 45V2￿)￿45 " 1￿￿5 " 1￿ ￿ 452 " 35 ￿ 2￿
2)￿45 " 1￿3e2
.   #   
This expression has a positive sign as long as )￿45 " 1￿￿5 " 1￿ ￿ 452 " 35 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 0. By using




￿45 " 1￿￿5 " 1￿ ￿ 452 " 35 ￿ 2 ￿ 0.   #   
The left hand-side of this equation is strictly concave, reaching a maximum of "26.579 ￿ 0a t
5￿2.13086. Therefore, firm 2’s profits are positive.
Finally, we show that for the cost function C￿e￿ ￿ k
e2 , neither of the firms has an incentive
to leapfrog its rival’s choice. Therefore, the set of cost functions for which an equilibrium exists
is not empty. Suppose first that firm 2 chooses e2
’￿5’￿ given by equations ( ref: cpo2 ) and
( ref: equi ). Suppose that firm 1 deviates by choosing e1 ￿ e2
’. Then, in the second stage, since
environmental choices are observed before firms set their prices, firm 2 will optimally fix pricep1 in equation ( ref: p1 ) while firm 1 will set price p2 also en ( ref: p1 ). Profits from such a








" C￿e1￿.   #   
For C￿e￿ ￿ k
e2 , we have
$1￿e1,e2
’￿ ￿ 31.5818kV2￿7.89544k2 " e1V2￿
e1￿31.5818k2 ￿ e1V2￿2 " k
e1
2 .   #   
The unique solution satisfying e1 ￿ e2
’ and the first and second order conditions is
§ e1 ￿ 5.95014k2/V2 which gives profits $1 ￿ "0.00271284V8/k2
4 ￿ 0. Clearly, seller 1 has no
incentives to leapfrog the cleaner seller’s choice.
Suppose second that firm 1 chooses e1
’￿5’￿ given by equations ( ref: cpo1 ) and ( ref: equi )
and that firm 2 deviates by choosing e2 ￿ e1
’. Then, as above, firm 2 will optimally fix price p1
’
in equation ( ref: p1 ) while firm 1 will set price p2
’. Profits from such a deviation are given by
$2￿e1
’,e2 ￿ e1
’￿ ￿ V2￿e2 " e1
’￿
2￿4e2 " e1
’￿2 " C￿e2￿.   #   
For ) ￿ "2, we have
$2￿e1
’,e2￿ ￿ 0.0241192V4￿0.0241192e2V2 " k2￿
2￿k2 " 0.0964767e2V2￿2 " k
e2
2   #   
In this case, the only solution satisfying e2 ￿ e1
’ and the first and second order conditions is
§ e2 ￿ 95.2009k2/V2 which gives profits $2 ￿ 0.00356346V4/k2
2. These profits are clearly lower
than equilibrium profits for this case $2
’ ￿ 0.0122193V4/k2
2. Therefore, firm 2 will not leapfrog
its rival’s choice. [newpage] 
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